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Abstract
We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes
to profit from the trader’s activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader’s position and learns
from observed price fluctuations. This is a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present an
algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior and conduct numerical experiments. Our
results demonstrate that the trader’s strategy differs significantly from one that would be optimal in the
absence of the arbitrageur. In particular, the trader must balance the conflicting desires of minimizing
price impact and minimizing information that is signaled through trading. Accounting for information
signaling and the presence of strategic adversaries can greatly reduce execution costs.
1. Introduction
When buying or selling securities, value is lost through execution costs such as exchange fees, commissions,
bid-ask spreads, and price impact. The latter can be dramatic and typically dominates other sources of
execution cost when trading large blocks, when the security is thinly traded, or when there is an urgent
demand for liquidity. Execution algorithms aim to reduce price impact by partitioning the quantity to be
traded and placing trades sequentially. Growing recognition for the importance of execution has fueled an
academic literature on the topic as well as the formation of specialized groups at investment banks and other
organizations to offer execution services.
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Optimal execution algorithms have been developed for a number of models. In the base model of
Bertsimas and Lo (1998), a stock price nominally follows a discrete-time random walk and the market
impact of a trade is permanent and linear in trade size. The authors establish that expected cost is min-
imized by an equipartitioning policy. This policy trades equal amounts over time increments within the
trading horizon. Further developments have led to optimal execution algorithms for models that incor-
porate price predictions (Bertsimas and Lo, 1998), bid-ask spreads and resilience (Obizhaeva and Wang,
2005; Alfonsi et al., 2007a), nonlinear price impact models (Almgren, 2003; Alfonsi et al., 2007b), and risk
aversion (Subramanian and Jarrow, 2001; Almgren and Chriss, 2000; Dubil, 2002; Huberman and Stanzl,
2005; Engle and Ferstenberg, 2006; Hora, 2006; Almgren and Lorenz, 2006; Schied and Schönenborn, 2007;
Lorenz, 2008).
The aforementioned results offer insight into how one should partition a block and sequence trades
under various assumptions about market dynamics and objectives. The resulting algorithms, however, are
unrealistic in that they exhibit predictable behavior. Such predictable behavior allows strategic adversaries,
which we call arbitrageurs, to “front-run” trades and profit at the expense of increased execution cost. For
example, consider liquidating a large block by an equipartitioning policy which sells an equal amount during
each minute of a trading day. Trades early in the day generate abnormal price movements, allowing an
observing arbitrageur to anticipate further liquidation. If the arbitrageur sells short and closes his position at
the end of the day, he profits from expected price decreases. The arbitrageur’s actions amplify price impact
and therefore increase execution costs.
Several recent papers study game-theoretic models of execution in the presence of strategic arbitrageurs
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005; Carlin et al., 2007; Schönenborn and Schied, 2007). However, these
models involve games with symmetric information, in which arbitrageurs know the position to be liquidated.
In more realistic scenarios, this information would be the private knowledge of the trader, and the arbitrageurs
would make inferences as to the trader’s position based on observed market activity.
This type of information asymmetry is central to effective execution. The fact that his position is unknown
to others allows the trader to greatly reduce execution costs. But to do so requires the deliberate management
of “information leakage”, or the signals that are transmitted via trading activity. Further, the desire to
minimize information signaling may be at odds with the desire to minimize price impact. A model through
which such signaling can be studied must account for uncertainty among arbitrageurs and their ability to learn
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from observed price fluctuations. In this paper we formulate and study a simple model which we believe to
be the first that meets this requirement.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We formulate the optimal execution problem as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. This
game involves a trader and a single arbitrageur. Both agents are risk neutral, and market dynamics
evolve according to a linear permanent price impact model. The trader seeks to liquidate his position
in a finite time horizon. The arbitrageur attempts to infer the position of the trader by observing market
price movements, and seeks to exploit this information for profit.
2. We develop an algorithm that computes perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior.
3. We demonstrate that the associated equilibrium strategies take on a simple structure: Trades placed by
the trader are linear in the trader’s position, the arbitrageur’s position and the arbitrageur’s expectation
of the trader’s position. Trades placed by the arbitrageur are linear in the arbitrageur’s position and his
expectation of the trader’s position. Equilibrium policies depend on the time horizon and a parameter
that we call the “relative volume”. This parameter captures the magnitude of the per-period activity of
the trader relative to the exogenous fluctuations of the market.
4. We present computational results that make several points about perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our
model:
(a) In the presence of adversaries, there are significant potential benefits to employing perfect
Bayesian equilibrium strategies.
(b) Unlike strategies proposed based on prior models in the literature, which exhibit determinis-
tic sequences of trades, trades in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium adaptively respond to price
fluctuations; the trader leverages these random outcomes to conceal his activity.
(c) When the relative volume of the trader’s activity is low, in equilibrium, the trader can ignore the
presence of the arbitrageur and will equipartition to minimize price impact. Alternatively, when
the relative volume is high, the trader will concentrate his trading activity in a short time interval
so as to minimize signaling.
(d) The presence of the arbitrageur leads to a spill-over effect. That is, the trader’s expected loss due
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to the arbitrageur’s presence is larger than the expected profit of the arbitrageur. Hence, other
market participants benefit from the arbitrageur’s activity.
5. We discuss how the basic model presented can be can be extended to incorporate a number of additional
features, such as transient price impact and risk aversion.
Solving for perfect Bayesian equilibrium in dynamic games with asymmetric information is notoriously
difficult. What facilitates effective computation in our model is that, in equilibrium, each agent solves a
tractable linear-quadratic Gaussian control problem. Similar approaches based on linear-quadratic Gaussian
control have previously been used to analyze equilibrium behavior of traders with private information. This
line of work begins with the seminal paper of Kyle (1985), and includes many subsequent papers (e.g.,
Foster and Viswanathan, 1994, 1996; Vayanos, 2001). Among these contributions, Foster and Viswanathan
(1994) come closest to the model and method we propose. In the model of that paper, there are two strategic
traders, many “noise” traders, and a market maker. The strategic traders possess information that is not
initially reflected in market prices. One trader knows more than the other. The more informed trader adapts
trades to maximize his expected payoff, and this entails controlling how his private information is revealed
through price fluctuations. This model parallels ours if we think of the arbitrageur as the less informed trader.
However, in our model there is no private information about future dividends but instead uncertainty about the
size of the position to be liquidated. Further, in the model of Foster and Viswanathan (1994), trades influence
prices because the market maker tries to infer the traders’ private information whereas, in our setting, there
is an exogenously specified price impact model. The algorithm we develop bears some similarity to that of
Foster and Viswanathan (1994), but requires new features designed to address differences in our model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our problem formulation.
Section 3 discusses how perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this model is characterized by a dynamic program.
A practical algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior is developed in Section 4. This
algorithm is applied in computational studies, for which results are presented and interpreted in Section 5.
Several extensions of this model are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 makes some closing remarks
and suggests directions for future work. Proofs of all theoretical results are presented in the appendices.
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2. Problem Formulation
In this section, the optimal execution problem is formulated as a game of asymmetric information. Our
formulation makes a number of simplifying assumptions and we omit several factors that are important in
the practical implementation of execution strategies, for example, transient price impact and risk aversion.
Our goal here is to highlight the strategic and informational aspects of execution in a streamlined fashion.
However, these assumptions are discussed in more detail and a number of extensions of this basic model are
presented in Section 6.
2.1. Game Structure
Consider a game that evolves over a finite horizon in discrete time steps t = 0, . . . , T + 1. There are two
players: a trader and an arbitrageur. The trader begins with a position x0 ∈ R in a stock, which he must
liquidate by time T . Denote his position at each time t by xt, and thus require that xt = 0 for t ≥ T . The
arbitrageur begins with a position y0. Denote his position at each time t by yt. In general, the arbitrageur
has additional flexibility and will not be limited to the same time horizon as the trader. For simplicity, this
flexibility is modelled by assuming that the arbitrageur has one additional period of trading activity. In other
words, though we do require that yT+1 = 0, we do not require that yT = 0. This assumption will be revisited
in Section 6.1.
2.2. Price Dynamics
Denote the price of the stock at time t by pt. This price evolves according to the permanent linear price
impact model given by
(1) pt = pt−1 +∆pt = pt−1 + λ(ut + vt) + ǫt.
Here, λ > 0 is a parameter that reflects the sensitivity of prices to trade size, and ut and vt are, respectively,
the quantities of stock purchased by the trader and the arbitrageur at time t. Note that, given the horizon of
the trader, uT+1 , 0. The positions evolve according to
xt = xt−1 + ut, and yt = yt−1 + vt.
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The sequence {ǫt} is a normally distributed IID process with ǫt ∼ N(0, σ2ǫ ), for some σǫ > 0. This noise
sequence represents the random and exogenous fluctuations of market prices. We assume that the trading
decisions ut and vt are made at time t− 1, and executed at the price pt at time t. Note that there is no drift
term in the price evolution equation (1). In the intraday horizon of typical optimal execution problems, this is
usually a reasonable assumption. This assumption will be revisited in Section 6.3. Further, the price impact
in (1) is permanent in the sense that it is long-lived relative to the length of the time horizon T . In Section 6.3
we will allow for transient price impact as well.imp
2.3. Information Structure
The information structure of the game is as follows. The dynamics of the game (in particular, the parameters
λ and σǫ) and the time horizon T are mutually known. From the perspective of the arbitrageur, the initial
position x0 of the trader is unknown. Further, the trader’s actions ut are not directly observed. However,
the arbitrageur begins with a prior distribution φ0 on the trader’s initial position x0. As the game evolves
over time, the arbitrageur observes the price change ∆pt at each time t. The arbitrageur updates his beliefs
based on these price movements, at any time t maintaining a posterior distribution φt of the trader’s current
position xt, based on his observation of the history of the game up to and including time t.
From the trader’s perspective, it is assumed that everything is known. This is motivated by the fact that
the arbitrageur’s initial position y0 will typically be zero and the trader can go through the same inference
process as the arbitrageur to arrive at the prior distribution φ0. Given a prescribed policy for the arbitrageur
(for example, in equilibrium), the trader can subsequently reconstruct the arbitrageur’s positions and beliefs
over time, given the public observations of market price movements. We do make the assumption, however,
that any deviations on the part of the arbitrageur from his prescribed policy will not mislead the trader. In
our context, this assumption is important for tractability. We discuss the situation where this assumption is
relaxed, and the trader does not have perfect knowledge of the arbitrageur’s positions and beliefs, in Section 7.
2.4. Policies
The trader’s purchases are governed by a policy, which is a sequence of functions π = {π1, . . . , πT }. Each
function πt+1 maps xt, yt, and φt, to a decision ut+1 at time t. Similarly, the arbitrageur follows a policy
ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψT+1}. Each function ψt+1 maps yt and φt to a decision vt+1 made at time t. Since policies
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for the trader and arbitrageur must result in liquidation, we require that πT (xT−1, yT−1, φT−1) = −xT−1
and ψT+1(yT , φT ) = −yT . Denote the set of trader policies by Π and the set of arbitrageur policies by Ψ.
Note that implicit in the above description is the restriction to policies that are Markovian in the following
sense: the state of the game at time t is summarized for the trader and arbitrageur by the tuples (xt, yt, φt)
and (yt, φt), respectively, and each player’s action is only a function of his state. Further, the policies are
pure strategies in the sense that, as a function of the player’s state, the actions are deterministic. In general,
one may wish to consider policies which determine actions as a function of the entire history of the game up
to a given time, and allow randomization over the choice of action. Our assumptions will exclude equilibria
from this more general class. However, it will be the case that for the equilibria that we do find, arbitrary
deviations that are history dependent and/or randomized will not be profitable.
If the arbitrageur applies an action vt and assumes the trader uses a policy πˆ ∈ Π, then upon observation
of ∆pt at time t, the arbitrageur’s beliefs are updated in a Bayesian fashion according to
(2) φt(S) = Pr
(
xt ∈ S | φt−1, yt−1, λ(πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) + vt) + ǫt = ∆pt
)
,
for all measurable sets S ⊂ R. Note that ∆pt here is an observed numerical value which could have resulted
from a trader action ut 6= πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1). As such, the trader is capable of misleading the arbitrageur
to distort his posterior distribution φt.
2.5. Objectives
Assume that both the trader and the arbitrageur are risk neutral and seek to maximize their expected profits
(this assumption will be revisited in Section 6.2). Profit is computed according to the change of book value,
which is the sum of a player’s cash position and asset position, valued at the prevailing market price. Hence,
the profits generated by the trader and arbitrageur between time t and time t+ 1 are, respectively,
pt+1xt+1 − pt+1ut+1 − ptxt = ∆pt+1xt, and pt+1yt+1 − pt+1vt+1 − ptyt = ∆pt+1yt.
If the trader uses policy π and the arbitrageur uses policy ψ and assumes the trader uses policy πˆ, the
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trader expects profits
U
π,(ψ,πˆ)
t (xt, yt, φt) , E
π,(ψ,πˆ)
[
T−1∑
τ=t
∆pτ+1xτ
∣∣∣∣∣ xt, yt, φt
]
,
over times τ = t+1, . . . , T . Here, the superscripts indicate that trades are executed based on π and ψ, while
beliefs are updated based on πˆ. Similarly, the arbitrageur expects profits
V
(ψ,πˆ),π
t (yt, φt) , E
π,(ψ,πˆ)
[
T∑
τ=t
∆pτ+1yτ
∣∣∣∣∣ yt, φt
]
,
over times τ = t + 1, . . . , T + 1. Here, the conditioning in the expectation implicitly assumes that xt is
distributed according to φt.
Note that −Uπ,(ψ,πˆ)t (x0, y0, φ0) is the trader’s expected execution cost. For practical choices of π, ψ,
and πˆ, we expect this quantity to be positive since the trader is likely to sell his shares for less than the initial
price. To compress notation, for any π, ψ, and t, let
Uπ,ψt , U
π,(ψ,π)
t , and V
ψ,π
t , V
(ψ,π),π
t .
2.6. Equilibrium Concept
As a solution concept, we consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). This is a
refinement of Nash equilibrium that rules out implausible outcomes by requiring subgame perfection and
consistency with Bayesian belief updates. In particular, a policy π ∈ Π is a best response to (ψ, πˆ) ∈ Ψ×Π
if
(3) Uπ,(ψ,πˆ)t (xt, yt, φt) = max
π′∈Π
U
π′,(ψ,πˆ)
t (xt, yt, φt),
for all t, xt, yt, and φt. Similarly, a policy ψ ∈ Ψ is a best response to π ∈ Π if
(4) V ψ,πt (yt, φt) = max
ψ′∈Ψ
V ψ
′,π
t (yt, φt),
for all t, yt, and φt. We define perfect Bayesian equilibrium, specialized to our context, as follows:
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Definition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a pair of policies (π∗, ψ∗) ∈ Π×Ψ such that:
1. π∗ is a best response to (ψ∗, π∗);
2. ψ∗ is a best response to π∗.
In a PBE, each player’s action at time t depends on positions xt and/or yt and the belief distribution φt.
These arguments, especially the distribution, make computation and representation of a PBE challenging. We
will settle for a more modest goal. We compute policy actions only for cases where φt is Gaussian. When the
initial distribution φ0 is Gaussian and players employ these PBE policies, we require that subsequent belief
distributions φt determined by Bayes’ rule (2) also be Gaussian. As such, computation of PBE policies over
the restricted domain of Gaussian distributions is sufficient to characterize equilibrium behavior given any
initial conditions involving a Gaussian prior. To formalize our approach, we now define a solution concept.
Definition 2. A policy π ∈ Π (or ψ ∈ Ψ) is a Gaussian best response to (ψ, πˆ) ∈ Ψ × Π (or π ∈ Π)
if (3) (or (4)) holds for all t, xt, yt, and Gaussian φt. A Gaussian perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair
(π∗, ψ∗) ∈ Π×Ψ of policies such that
1. π∗ is a Gaussian best response to (ψ∗, π∗);
2. ψ∗ is a Gaussian best response to π∗;
3. if φ0 is Gaussian and arbitrageur assumes the trader uses π∗ then, independent of the true actions of
the trader, the beliefs φ1, . . . , φT−1 are Gaussian.
Note that when Gaussian PBE policies are used and the prior φ0 is Gaussian, the system behavior is
indistinguishable from that of a PBE since the policies produce actions that concur with PBE policies at all
states that are visited.
Given a belief distribution φt, define the quantities
µt , E[xt | φt], σ
2
t , E
[
(xt − µt)
2
∣∣φt] , and ρt , λσt/σǫ.
Since λ and σǫ are constants, ρt is simply a scaled version of the standard deviation σt. The ratio λ/σǫ acts
as a normalizing constant that accounts for the informativeness of observations. The reason we consider this
9
scaling is that it highlights certain invariants across problem instances. In Section 5.2, we will interpret the
value of ρ0 as the relative volume of the trader’s activity in the marketplace. For the moment, it is sufficient
to observe that if the distribution φt is Gaussian, it is characterized by (µt, ρt).
3. Dynamic Programming Analysis
In this section, we develop abstract dynamic programming algorithms for computing PBE and Gaussian PBE.
We also discuss structural properties of associated value functions. The dynamic programming recursion
relies on the computation of equilibria for single-stage games, and we also discuss the existence of such
equilibria. The algorithms of this section are not implementable, but their treatment motivates the design of
a practical algorithm that will be presented in the next section.
3.1. Stage-Wise Decomposition
The process of computing a PBE and the corresponding value functions can be decomposed into a series of
single-stage equilibrium problems via a dynamic programming backward recursion. We begin by defining
some notation. For each πt, ψt, and ut, define a dynamic programming operator F (ψt,πˆt)ut by
(
F (ψt,πˆt)ut U
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) , E
(ψt,πˆt)
ut
[
λ(ut + vt)xt−1 + U(xt, yt, φt) | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1
]
,
for all functions U , where xt = xt−1 + ut, yt = yt−1 + vt, vt = ψt(yt−1, φt−1), and φt results from the
Bayesian update (2) given that the arbitrageur assumes the trader trades πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) while the trader
actually trades ut. Similarly, for each πt and vt, define a dynamic programming operator Gπtvt by
(
GπtvtV
)
(yt−1, φt−1) , E
πt
vt
[
λ(ut + vt)yt−1 + V (yt, φt) | yt−1, φt−1
]
,
for all functions V , where yt = yt−1 + vt, ut = πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1), xt−1 is distributed according to the
belief φt−1, and φt results from the Bayesian update (2) given that the arbitrageur correctly assumes the
trader trades ut.
Consider Algorithm 1 for computing a PBE. In Step 1, the algorithm begins by initializing the terminal
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Algorithm 1 PBE Solver
1: Initialize the terminal value functions U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1 according to (5)–(6)
2: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
3: Compute (π∗t , ψ∗t ) such that for all xt−1, yt−1, and φt−1,
π∗t (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
ut U
∗
t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)
ψ∗t (yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
G
π∗t
vt V
∗
t
)
(yt−1, φt−1)
4: Compute the value functions at the previous time step by setting, for all xt−1, yt−1, and φt−1,U∗t−1(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)←
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
π∗t
U∗t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)
V ∗t−1(yt−1, φt−1)←
(
G
π∗t
ψ∗t
V ∗t
)
(yt−1, φt−1)
5: end for
value functions U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1. These terminal value functions have a simple closed form in equilibrium.
This is because, at time T , the trader must liquidate his position, hence π∗T (xT−1, yT−1, φT−1) = −xT−1.
Similarly, arbitrageur must liquidate his position over times T and T + 1. In equilibrium, he will do so
optimally, thus his value function takes the form
V ∗T−1(yT−1, φT−1) = max
vT
E
[
λ(−xT−1 + vT )yT−1 − λ(yT−1 + vT )
2
∣∣ yT−1, φT−1]
= −λ
(
µT−1 +
3
4yT−1
)
yT−1,
(5)
where the optimizing decision isψ∗T (yT−1, φT−1) = −12yT−1. It is straightforward to derive the correspond-
ing expression of the trader’s value function,
U∗T−1(xT−1, yT−1, φT−1) = E
[
λ
(
−xT−1 −
1
2yT−1
)
xT−1
∣∣ xT−1, yT−1, φT−1]
= −λ
(
xT−1 +
1
2yT−1
)
xT−1.
(6)
At each time t < T , equilibrium policies must satisfy the best-response conditions (3)–(4). Given the
value functions U∗t and V ∗t , these conditions decompose recursively according to to Step 3. Given such a
pair (π∗t , ψ∗t ), the value functions U∗t−1 and V ∗t−1 for the prior time period are, in turn, computed in Step 4.
It is easy to see that, so long as Step 3 is carried out successfully each time it is invoked, the algorithm
produces a PBE (π∗, φ∗) along with value functions U∗t = U
π∗,ψ∗
t and V ∗t = V
ψ∗,π∗
t . However, the algorithm
is not implementable. For starters, the functions π∗t ,ψ∗t , U∗t−1, and V ∗t−1, which must be computed and stored,
have infinite domains.
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3.2. Linear Policies
Consider the following class of policies:
Definition 3. A function πt is linear if there are coefficients aρt−1x,t , a
ρt−1
y,t and a
ρt−1
µ,t , which are functions of
ρt−1, such that
(7) πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = aρt−1x,t xt−1 + aρt−1y,t yt−1 + aρt−1µ,t µt−1,
for all xt−1, yt−1, and φt−1. Similarly, function ψt is linear if there is a coefficients bρt−1y,t and b
ρt−1
µ,t , which
is a function of ρt−1, such that
(8) ψt(yt−1, φt−1) = bρt−1y,t yt−1 + bρt−1µ,t µt−1,
for all yt−1 and φt−1. A policy is linear if the component functions associated with times 1, . . . , T − 1 are
linear.
By restricting attention to linear policies and Gaussian beliefs, we can apply an algorithm similar to that
presented in the previous section to compute a Gaussian PBE. In particular, consider Algorithm 2. This
algorithm aims to computes a single-stage equilibrium that is linear. Further, actions and values are only
computed and stored for elements of the domain for which φt−1 is Gaussian. This is only viable if the
iterates U∗t and V ∗t , which are computed only for Gaussian φt, provide sufficient information for subsequent
computations. This is indeed the case, as a consequence of the following result.
Theorem 1. If the belief distribution φt−1 at time is Gaussian, and the arbitrageur assumes that the trader’s
policy πˆt is linear with πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = aˆρt−1x,t xt−1+aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1+aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1, then the belief distribution
φt is also Gaussian. The mean µt is a linear function of yt−1, µt−1, and the observed price change ∆pt,
with coefficients that are deterministic functions of the scaled variance ρt−1. The scaled variance ρt evolves
according to
(9) ρ2t =
(
1 + aˆ
ρt−1
x,t
)2( 1
ρ2t−1
+ (aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
)−1
.
In particular, ρt is a deterministic function of ρt−1.
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It follows from this result that if π∗ is linear then, for Gaussian φt−1, F (ψ
∗,π∗)
ut U
∗
t only depends on values
of U∗t evaluated at Gaussian φt. Similarly, if π∗ is linear then, for Gaussian φt−1, Gπ
∗
vt V
∗
t only depends
on values of V ∗t evaluated at Gaussian φt. It also follows from this theorem that Algorithm 2, which only
computes actions and values for Gaussian beliefs, results in a Gaussian PBE (π∗, ψ∗). We should mention,
though, that Algorithm 2 is still not implementable since the restricted domains of U∗t and V ∗t remain infinite.
Algorithm 2 Linear-Gaussian PBE Solver
1: Initialize the terminal value functions U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1 according to (5)–(6)
2: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
3: Compute linear (π∗t , ψ∗t ) such that for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1,
π∗t (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
ut U
∗
t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)
ψ∗t (yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
G
π∗t
vt V
∗
t
)
(yt−1, φt−1)
4: Compute the value functions at the previous time step by setting, for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1,
U∗t−1(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)←
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
π∗t
U∗t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1)
V ∗t−1(yt−1, φt−1)←
(
G
π∗t
ψ∗t
V ∗t
)
(yt−1, φt−1)
5: end for
Motivated by these observations, for the remainder of the paper, we will focus on computing equilibria
of the following form:
Definition 4. A pair of policies (π∗, ψ∗) ∈ Π×Ψ is a linear-Gaussian perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is a
Gaussian PBE and each policy is linear.
3.3. Quadratic Value Functions
Closely associated with linear policies are the following class of value functions:
Definition 5. A function Ut is trader-quadratic-decomposable (TQD) if there are coefficients cρtxx,t, cρtyy,t,
cρtµµ,t, c
ρt
xy,t, c
ρt
xµ,t, c
ρt
yµ,t and c
ρt
0,t, which are functions of ρt, such that
Ut(xt, yt, φt) = −λ
(
1
2c
ρt
xx,tx
2
t +
1
2c
ρt
yy,ty
2
t +
1
2c
ρt
µµ,tµ
2
t + c
ρt
xy,txtyt + c
ρt
xµ,txtµt + c
ρt
yµ,tytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
cρt0,t
)
,
(10)
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for all xt, yt, and φt. A function Vt as arbitrageur-quadratic-decomposable (AQD) if there are coefficients
dρtyy,t, d
ρt
µµ,t, d
ρt
yµ,t and d
ρt
0,t, which are functions of ρt, such that
(11) Vt(yt, φt) = −λ
(
1
2d
ρt
yy,ty
2
t +
1
2d
ρt
µµ,tµ
2
t + d
ρt
yµ,tytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
dρt0,t
)
,
for all yt and φt.
In equilibrium, U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1 are given by Step 1 of Algorithm 2, and hence are TQD/AQD. The
following theorem captures how TQD and AQD structure preserved in the dynamic programming recursion
given linear policies.
Theorem 2. If U∗t is TQD and V ∗t is AQD, and Step 3 of Algorithm 2 produces a linear pair (π∗t , ψ∗t ), then
U∗t−1 and V ∗t−1, defined by Step 4 of Algorithm 2 are TQD and AQD, respectively.
Hence, each pair of value functions generated by Algorithm 2 is TQD/AQD. A great benefit of this property
comes from the fact that, for a fixed value of ρt, each associated value function can be encoded using just a
few parameters.
3.4. Simplified Conditions for Equilibrium
Algorithm 2 relies for each t on existence of a pair (π∗t , ψ∗t ) of linear functions that satisfy single-stage
equilibrium conditions. In general, this would require verifying that each policy function is the Gaussian
best response for all possible states. The following theorem provides a much simpler set of conditions. In
Section 4, we will exploit these conditions in order to compute equilibrium policies.
Theorem 3. Suppose that U∗t and V ∗t and TQD/AQD value functions specified by (10)–(11), and (π∗t , ψ∗t )
are linear policies specified by (7)–(8). Assume that, for all ρt−1, the policy coefficients satisfy the first order
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conditions
0 =
(
ρ2t c
ρt
µµ,t + 2ρtc
ρt
xµ,t + c
ρt
xx,t
)(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)3
+
(
3cρtxx,t + 3ρtc
ρt
xµ,t − 1
)(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2
+
(
3cρtxx,t + ρtc
ρt
xµ,t − 2
)
a
ρt−1
x,t + c
ρt
xx,t − 1,
(12)
a
ρt−1
y,t = −
(
b
ρt−1
y,t + 1
)(
cρtxy,t + αtc
ρt
yµ,t
)
cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)c
ρt
xµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
,(13)
a
ρt−1
µ,t = −
a
ρt−1
x,t b
ρt−1
µ,t
(
cρtxy,t + αtc
ρt
yµ,t
)
+ αt
(
cρtxµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
)
/ρ2t−1
a
ρt−1
x,t
(
cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)c
ρt
xµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
) ,(14)
b
ρt−1
y,t =
1− dρtyµ,ta
ρt−1
y,t
dρtyy,t
− 1, b
ρt−1
µ,t = −
(1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t + a
ρt−1
x,t )d
ρt
yµ,t
dρtyy,t
,(15)
and the second order conditions
(16) cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)cρtxµ,t + αtcρtµµ,t > 0, dρtyy,t > 0,
where the quantities αt and ρt satisfy
(17) αt =
a
ρt−1
x,t
(
1 + a
ρt−1
x,t
)
1/ρ2t−1 +
(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2 , ρ2t = (1 + aρt−1x,t )2
(
1
ρ2t−1
+
(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2)−1
.
Then, (π∗t , ψ∗t ) satisfy the single-stage equilibrium conditions
π∗t (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
ut U
∗
t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1),
ψ∗t (yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
G
π∗t
vt V
∗
t
)
(yt−1, φt−1),
for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1.
Note that, while this theorem provides sufficient conditions for linear policies satisfying equilibrium
conditions, it does not guarantee the existence or uniqueness of such policies. These remain an open issues.
However, we support the plausibility of existence through the following result on Gaussian best responses to
linear policies. It asserts that, if ψt and πˆt are linear, then there is a linear best-response πt for the trader in
the single-stage game. Similarly, if πt is linear then there is a linear best-response ψt for the arbitrageur in
the single-stage game.
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Theorem 4. If Ut is TQD, ψt is linear, and πˆt is linear, then there exists a linear πt such that
πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F (ψt,πˆt)ut Ut
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1),
for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1, so long as the optimization problem is bounded. Similarly, if Vt is
AQD and πt is linear then there exists a linear ψt such that
ψt(yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
Gπtvt Vt
)
(yt−1, φt−1),
for all yt−1 and Gaussian φt−1, so long as the optimization problem is bounded.
Based on these results, if the trader (arbitrageur) assumes that the arbitrageur (trader) uses a linear policy then
it suffices for the trader (arbitrageur) to restrict himself to linear policies. Though not a proof of existence,
this observation that the set of linear policies is closed under the operation of best response motivates an aim
to compute linear-Gaussian PBE.
4. Algorithm
The previous section presented abstract algorithms and results that lay the groundwork for the development
of a practical algorithm which we will present in this section. We begin by discussing a parsimonious
representation of policies.
4.1. Representation of Policies
Algorithm 2 takes as input three values that parameterize our model: (λ, σǫ, T ). The algorithm output can
be encoded in terms of coefficients {aρt−1x,t , a
ρt−1
y,t , a
ρt−1
µ,t , b
ρt−1
y,t , b
ρt−1
µ,t }, for every ρt−1 > 0 and each time
step1 t = 1, . . . , T − 1. These coefficients parameterize linear-Gaussian PBE policies. Note that the output
depends on λ and σǫ only through ρt. Hence, given any λ and σǫ with the same ρt, the algorithm obtains
the same coefficients. This means that the algorithm need only be executed once to obtain solutions for all
choices of λ and σǫ.
1Recall, from the discussion in Section 3.1, that aρt−1x,T = −1, a
ρt−1
y,T = a
ρt−1
µ,T = 0, b
ρt−1
y,T = −1/2, b
ρt−1
µ,T+1 = b
ρt−1
µ,T = 0, and
b
ρt−1
y,T+1 = −1, for all ρt−1.
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Now, for each t, the policy coefficients are deterministic functions of ρt−1. For a fixed value of ρt−1,
the coefficients can be stored as five numerical values. However, it is not feasible to simultaneously store
coefficients associated with all possible values of ρt−1. Fortunately, given a linear policy for the trader,
Theorem 1 establishes ρt is a deterministic function of ρt−1. Thus, the initial value ρ0 determines all
subsequent values of ρt. It follows that, for a fixed value of ρ0, over the relevant portion of its domain, a
linear-Gaussian PBE can be encoded in terms of 5(T − 1) numerical values. We will design an algorithm
that aims to compute these 5(T − 1) parameters, which we will denote by {ax,t, ay,t, aµ,t, by,t, bµ,t}, for
t = 1, . . . , T − 1. These parameters allow us to determine PBE actions at all visited states, so long as the
initial value of ρ0 is fixed.
4.2. Searching for Equilibrium Variances
The parameters{ax,t , ay,t, aµ,t, by,t, by,t} characterize linear-Gaussian PBE policies restricted to the sequence
ρ0, . . . , ρT−1 generated in the linear-Gaussian PBE. We do not know in advance what this sequence will be,
and as such, we seek simultaneously compute this sequence alongside the policy parameters.
One way to proceed, reminiscent of the bisection method employed by Kyle (1985) and Foster and Viswanathan
(1994) would be to conjecture a value for ρT−1. Given a candidate value ρˆT−1, the preceding values
ρˆT−2, . . . , ρˆ0, along with policy parameters for times T − 1, . . . , 1, can be computed by sequentially solv-
ing the equations (12)–(17) for single-stage equilibria. The resulting policies form a linear-Gaussian PBE,
restricted to the sequence ρˆ0, . . . , ρˆT−1 that they would generate if ρ0 = ρˆ0. One can then seek a value of
ρˆT−1 such that the resulting ρˆ0 is indeed equal to ρ0. This can be accomplished, for example, via bisection
search.
The bisection method can be numerically unstable, however. This is because, the belief update equation
(9) is used to sequentially compute the values ρˆT−2, . . . , ρˆ0 backwards in time. When the target value of ρ0
is very large, small changes in ρˆT−1 can result in very large changes in ρˆ0, making it difficult to match the
precisely value of ρ0.
To avoid this numerical instability, consider Algorithm 3. This algorithm maintains a guess πˆ of the
equilibrium policy of the trader, and, along with the initial value ρ0, this is used to generate the sequence
ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆT−1 by applying the belief update equation (9) forward in time. This sequence of values is then used
in the single-stage equilibrium conditions to solve for policies (π∗, ψ∗). A sequence of values ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆT−1
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is then computed forward in time using the policy π∗. If this sequence matches the sequence generated by
the guess πˆ, then the algorithm has converged. Otherwise, the algorithm is repeated with a new guess policy
that is a convex combination of πˆ and π∗. Since this algorithm only ever applies the belief equation (9)
forward in time, it does not suffer from the numerical instabilities of the bisection method.
Note that Step 6 of the algorithm treats ρt−1 as a free variable that is solved alongside the policy parameters
{ax,t, ay,t, aµ,t, by,t, bµ,t}. These variables are computed by simultaneously solving the system of equations
(12)–(17) for single-stage equilibrium. To be precise, ax,t is obtained by solving the cubic polynomial
equation (12) numerically. Given a value for ax,t, the remaining parameters {ay,t, aµ,t, by,t, bµ,t} are be
obtained by solving the linear system of equations (13)–(15), while ρt−1 is obtained through (17) . It can
then be verified that the second order condition (16) holds. Algorithm 3 is implementable and we use it in
computational studies presented in the next section.
Algorithm 3 Linear-Gaussian PBE Solver with Variance Search
1: Initialize πˆ to an equipartitioning policy
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
3: Compute ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆT−1 according to the initial value ρ0 and the policy πˆ by (9)
4: Initialize the terminal value functions U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1 according to (5)–(6)
5: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
6: Compute linear (π∗t , ψ∗t ) and ρt−1 solving the single-stage equilibrium conditions (12)–(17), assuming
that ρt = ρˆt
7: Compute the value functions U∗t−1 and V ∗t−1 at the previous time step given (π∗t , ψ∗t )
8: end for
9: Compute ρ˜1, . . . , ρ˜T−1 according to the initial value ρ0 and the policy π∗ by (9)
10: if ρˆ = ρ˜ then
11: return
12: else
13: Set πˆ ← γkπˆ + (1− γk)π∗, where γk ∈ [0, 1) is a step-size
14: end if
15: end for
5. Computational Results
In this section, we present computational results generated using Algorithm 3. In Section 5.1, we introduce
some alternative, intuitive policies which will serve as a basis of comparison to the linear-Gaussian PBE
policy. In Section 5.2, we discuss the importance of the parameter ρ0 , λσ0/σǫ in the qualitative behavior
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of the Gaussian PBE policy and interpret ρ0 as a measure of the “relative volume” of the trader’s activity
in the marketplace. In Section 5.3, we discuss the relative performance of the policies from the perspective
of the execution cost of the trader. Here, we demonstrate experimentally that the Gaussian PBE policy can
offer substantial benefits. In Section 5.4, we examine the signaling that occurs through price movements.
Finally, in Section 5.5, we highlight the fact that the PBE policy is adaptive and dynamic, and seeks to exploit
exogenous market fluctuations in order to minimize execution costs.
5.1. Alternative Policies
In order to understand the behavior of linear-Gaussian PBE policies, we first define two alternative policies
for the trader for the purpose of comparison. In the absence of an arbitrageur, it is optimal for the trader
to minimize execution costs by partitioning his position into T equally sized blocks and liquidating them
sequentially over the T time periods, as established by Bertsimas and Lo (1998). We refer to the resulting
policy πEQ as an equipartitioning policy. It is defined by
πEQt (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) , −
1
T − t+ 1
xt−1,
for all t, xt−1, yt−1, and φt−1.
Alternatively, the trader may wish to liquidate his position in a way so as to reveal as little information
as possible to the arbitrageur. Trading during the final two time periods T − 1 and T does not reveal
information to the arbitrageur in a fashion that can be exploited. This is because, as discussed in Section 3.1,
the arbitrageur’s optimal trades at time T and T +1 are vT = −yT−1/2 and vT+1 = −yT , respectively, and
these are independent of any belief of the arbitrageur with respect to the trader’s position. Given that the
trader is free to trade over these two time periods without any information leakage, it is natural to minimize
execution cost by equipartitioning over these two time periods. Hence, define the minimum revelation policy
πMR to be a policy that liquidates the trader’s position evenly across only the last two time periods. That is,
πMRt (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ,


0 if t < T − 1,
−12xt−1 if t = T − 1,
−xt−1 if t = T ,
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for all t, xt−1, yt−1, and φt−1.
5.2. Relative Volume
Observed in Section 4.1, linear-Gaussian PBE policies are determined as a function of the composite param-
eter ρ0 , λσ0/σǫ. In order to interpret this parameter, consider the dynamics of price changes,
∆pt = λ(ut + vt) + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ).
Here, ǫt is interpreted as the exogenous, random component of price changes. Alternatively, one can imagine
the random component of price changes are arising from the price impact of “noise traders”. Denote by zt
the total order flow from noise traders at time t, and consider a model where
∆pt = λ(ut + vt + zt), zt ∼ N(0, σ
2
z ).
If σǫ = λσz , these two models are equivalent. In that case,
ρ0 ,
λσ0
σǫ
=
σ0
σz
.
In other words, ρ0 can be interpreted as the ratio of the uncertainty of the total volume of the trader’s activity
to the per period volume of noise trading. As such, we refer to ρ0 as the relative volume.
We shall see in the following sections that, qualitatively, the performance and behavior of Gaussian PBE
policies are determined by the magnitude of ρ0. In the high relative volume regime, when ρ0 is large, either
the initial position uncertainty σ0 is very large or the volatility σz of the noise traders is very small. In these
cases, from the perspective of the arbitrageur, the trader’s activity contributes a significant informative signal
which can be decoded in the context of less significant exogenous random noise. Hence, the trader’s activity
early in the time horizon reveals significant information which can be exploited by the arbitrageur. Thus, it
may be better for the trader to defer his liquidation until the end of the time horizon.
Alternatively, in the low relative regime, when ρ0 is small, the arbitrageur cannot effectively distinguish
the activity of the trader from the noise traders in the market. Hence, the trader is free to distribute his trades
across the time horizon so as to minimize market impact, without fear of front-running by the arbitrageur.
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5.3. Policy Performance
Consider a pair of policies (π, ψ), and assume that the arbitrageur begins with a position y0 = 0 and an
initial belief φ0 = N(0, σ20). Given an initial position x0, the trader’s expected profit is U
π,ψ
0 (x0, 0, φ0).
One might imagine, however, that the initial position x0 represents one of many different trials where the
trader liquidates positions. It makes sense for this distribution of x0 over trials to be consistent with the
arbitrageurs belief φ0, since this belief could be based on past trials. Given this distribution, averaging
over trials results in expected profit E[Uπ,ψ0 (x0, 0, φ0) | φ0]. Alternatively, if the trader liquidates his entire
position immediately, the expected profit becomes E[−λx20 | φ0] = −λσ20 . We define the trader’s normalized
expected profit U¯(π, ψ) to be the ratio of these two quantities. When the trader’s value function is TQD, this
takes the form
U¯(π, ψ) ,
E
[
Uπ,ψ0 (x0, 0, φ0)
∣∣∣ φ0]
λσ20
= −
1
2
cρ0xx,0 +
1
ρ20
cρ00,0,
where cρ0xx,0 and c
ρ0
0,0 are the trader’s appropriate value function coefficients at time t = 0.
Analogously, the arbitrageur’s normalized expected profit V¯ (π, ψ) is defined to be the expected profit of
the arbitrageur normalized by the expected immediate liquidating cost of the trader. When the arbitrageur’s
value function is AQD, this takes the form
V¯ (π, ψ) ,
E
[
V ψ,π0 (x0, 0, φ0)
∣∣∣ φ0]
λσ20
=
1
ρ20
dρ00,0,
Now, let (π∗, ψ∗) denote a linear-Gaussian PBE. Since the corresponding value functions are TQD/AQD,
the normalized expected profits depend on the parameters {σ0, λ, σǫ} only through the relative volume
parameter ρ0 , λσ0/σǫ.
Similarly, given the equipartitioning policy πEQ, define ψEQ to be the optimal response of the arbitrageur
to the trader’s policy πEQ. This best response policy can be computed by solving the linear-quadratic control
problem corresponding to (4), via dynamic programming. The policy takes the form
ψEQt (yt−1, µt−1) =


−1
T+2−tyt−1 −
(T−t)(T−t+3)
2(T+1−t)(T+2−t)µt−1 if 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
−yT otherwise.
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Using a similar argument as above, it is easy to see that U¯(πEQ, ψEQ) and V¯ (πEQ, ψEQ) are also functions
of the parameter ρ0.
Finally, given the minimum revelation policyπMR , defineψMR to be the optimal response of the arbitrageur
to the trader’s policy πMR. It can be shown that, when y0 = 0 and µ0 = 0, the best response of the arbitrageur
to the minimum revelation policy is to do nothing–since no information is revealed by the trader in a useful
fashion, there is no opportunity to front-run. Hence,
U¯(πMR, ψMR) =
E
[
−12λx
2
0 −
1
4λx
2
0
∣∣ φ0]
λσ20
= −
3
4
, V¯ (πMR, ψMR) = 0.
In Figure 1, the normalized expected profits of various policies are plotted as functions of the relative
volume ρ0, for a time horizon T = 20. In all scenarios, as one might expect, the trader’s profit is negative
while the arbitrageur’s profit is positive. In all cases, the trader’s profit under the Gaussian PBE policy
dominates that under either the equipartitioning policy or the minimum revelation policy. This difference is
significant in moderate to high relative volume regimes.
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U¯(πEQ, ψEQ)
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U¯(πVT, ψV T )
Figure 1: The normalized expected profit of trading strategies for the time horizon T = 20.
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In the high relative volume regime, the equipartitioning policy fares particularly badly from the perspective
of the trader, performing up to a factor of 2 worse than the Gaussian PBE policy. This effect becomes
more pronounced over longer time horizons. The minimum revelation policy performs about as well as
the PBE policy. Asymptotically as ρ0 ↑ ∞, these policies offer equivalent performance in the sense that
U¯(π∗, ψ∗) ↑ U¯(πMR, ψMR) = 3/4.
On the other hand, in the low relative volume regime, the equipartitioning policy and the PBE policy
perform comparably. Indeed, define ψ0 by ψ0t , 0 for all t (that is, no trading by the arbitrageur). In the
absence of an arbitrageur, equipartitioning is the optimal policy for the trader, and backward recursion can
be used to show that
U¯(πEQ, ψ0) =
T + 1
2T
≈
1
2
.
Asymptotically as ρ0 ↓ 0, U¯(πEQ, ψEQ) ↓ U¯(πEQ, ψ0) and U¯(π∗, ψ∗) ↓ U¯(πEQ, ψ0). Thus, when the relative
volume is low, the effect of the arbitrageur becomes negligible when ρ0 is sufficiently small.
From the perspective of the arbitrageur in equilibrium, V¯ (π∗, ψ∗)→ 0 as ρ→ ±∞. In the low relative
volume regime, the arbitrageur cannot distinguish the past activity of the trader from noise, and hence is not
able to profitably predict and exploit the trader’s future activity. In the high relative volume regime, as we
shall see in Section 5.5, the trader conceals his position from the arbitrageur by deferring trading until the end
of the horizon. Here, as with the minimum revelation policy, the arbitrageur is not able to profitably exploit
the trader. Since the arbitrageur can choose not to trade at each period, his best response to any trading
strategy should lead to non-negative expected profit. In light of these observations, we can easily infer that
in equilibrium the arbitrageur’s profit curve should have at least one local maximum.
Both the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies trade at a constant rate, but over different,
extremal time intervals: the equipartitioning policy uses the entire time horizon, while the minimum revelation
policy uses only the last two time periods. A fairer benchmark policy might consider optimizing the choice
of time interval. Define the variable time policy πVT as follows: given the value ρ0, select the τ such that
trading at a constant rate ut = −x0τ over the last τ time periods results in the highest expected profit for
the trader, assuming that the arbitrageur uses a best response policy. Define ψVT to be the best response
of the arbitrageur to πVT. The variable time policy partially accounts for the presence of an arbitrary, and
the expected profit with the variable time strategy will always be better that of equipartitioning or minimum
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revelation. This is demonstrated by the U¯(πVT, ψVT) curve in Figure 1. However, the trader still fares better
with an equilibrium policy, particularly in the intermediate relative volume range, where the difference is
close to 20%.2
Examining Figure 1, it is clear that, in equilibrium, the sum of the normalized profits of the trader and
the arbitrageur is negative, and the magnitude of sum is larger than the magnitude of the loss incurred by the
trader in the absence of the arbitrageur. Define the spill-over to be the quantity
U¯(πEQ, ψ0)−
(
U¯(π∗, ψ∗) + V¯ (π∗, ψ∗)
)
.
This is the difference between the normalized expected profit of the trader in the absence of the arbitrageur,
under the optimal equipartitioning policy, and the combined normalized expected profits of the trader and
arbitrageur in equilibrium. The spill-over measures the benefit of the arbitrageur’s presence to the other
participants of the system. Note that this benefit is positive, and it is most significant in the high relative
volume regime.
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U¯(π∗, ψ∗) + V¯ (π∗, ψ∗)
)
Figure 2: The spill-over of the system for the time horizon T = 20.
In addition to the discussion of expected profits above, we can consider the variance of the trader’s profits
under different policies. Given a pair of policies (π, ψ), define the trader’s normalized variance of profit
VarU (π, ψ) as the variance under the policies (π, ψ) relative to the variance of immediate liquidation. In
other words,
VarU (π, ψ) =
Varπ,ψ
(∑T−1
τ=0 ∆pτ+1xτ
∣∣∣ φ0)
Var
(
−λx20 + ǫ1x0
∣∣ φ0) =
Varπ,ψ
(∑T−1
τ=0 ∆pτ+1xτ
∣∣∣ φ0)
2λ2σ40 + σ
2
ǫσ
2
0
,
2In practice, improvements of as low as 0.01% are considered significant.
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where, as before, the expectations are taken assuming the policies (π, ψ) are used, y0 = µ0 = 0, and
x0 ∼ φ0 = N(0, σ
2
0). Similarly, it is possible to see that, for a pair of linear policies (π, ψ), the trader’s
normalized variance of profit depends on the model parameters {σ0, λ, σǫ} only through ρ0.
In Figure 3, the trader’s normalized variance of profit is plotted under the different policies. The lowest
variance occurs when the trader equipartitions and there is no arbitrageur, this is the curve VarU(πEQ, ψ0).
When the arbitrageur is present, however, the variance in equilibrium VarU (π∗, ψ∗) is less than either when
the trader equipartitions (i.e., the curve VarU (πEQ, ψEQ)) or employs the minimum revelation policy (i.e., the
curveVarU (π
MR, ψMR)). Figure 4 shows the entire cumulative distribution function of the trader’s normalized
profit under various relative volume regimes. Given the presence of the arbitrageur, the equilibrium policy
has second-order dominance over equipartitioning in all relative volume regimes.
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Figure 3: The trader’s normalized variance of profit for the time horizon T = 20.
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(a) The low relative volume regime, ρ0 = 1.
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(b) The moderate relative volume regime, ρ0 = 10.
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(c) The high relative volume regime, ρ0 = 100.
Figure 4: The cumulative distribution of trader’s normalized profit for the time horizon T = 20.
5.4. Signaling
An important aspect of the linear-Gaussian PBE policy is that it accounts for information conveyed through
price movements. In order to understand this feature, define the relative uncertainty to be the standard
deviation of the arbitrageur’s belief about the trader’s position at time t, relative to that of the belief at time
0; i.e., the ratio σt/σ0. By considering the evolution of relative uncertainty over time for the Gaussian PBE
policy versus the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies, we can study the comparative signaling
behavior.
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Under any linear policy, the evolution of the relative uncertainty σt/σ0 over time is deterministic and
depends only on the parameter ρ0 . This is because of the fact thatσt/σ0 = ρt/ρ0 and the results in Section 4.1.
In Figure 5, the evolution of the relative uncertainty of the PBE policy is illustrated, for different values of
ρ0, as compared to the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies. In the low relative volume regime,
the relative uncertainty of the PBE policy evolves similarly to that of the equipartitioning policy. In the high
relative volume regime, very little information is revealed until close to the end of trading period under the
PBE policy. Indeed, the relative uncertainty between the equilibrium and the minimum revelation policies
are indistinguishable on the scale of Figure 5, when ρ0 = 10 or ρ0 = 100. These observations are consistent
with our results from Section 5.3.
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 5 10 15 20
t
σt
σ0
πMR, ρ0 = 1
πMR, ρ0 = 10
πMR, ρ0 = 100
π∗, ρ0 = 1
π∗, ρ0 = 10
π∗, ρ0 = 100
πEQ, ρ0 = 1
πEQ, ρ0 = 10
πEQ, ρ0 = 100
Figure 5: The evolution of relative uncertainty of the trader’s position for the time horizon T = 20.
5.5. Adaptive Trading
One important feature of the linear-Gaussian PBE policy is that it is adaptive in the sense that the trades
executed are random quantities that are dependent on the exogenous, stochastic fluctuations of the market.
This is in contrast to the policies developed in most of the optimal execution literature. For example, the
baseline equipartitioning policy of Bertsimas and Lo (1998) specifies a deterministic sequence of trades.
Static policies have also been derived under more complicated models (e.g., Almgren and Chriss, 2000;
27
Huberman and Stanzl, 2005; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2005; Alfonsi et al., 2007b). However, this behavior is
in contrast to what is observed amongst institutional traders and trading algorithms that are implemented
by practitioners. One justification for adaptive, price-responsive trading strategies is risk aversion. It has
been observed that optimal policies for certain risk averse objectives require dynamic trading (Hora, 2006;
Almgren and Lorenz, 2006). Our model provides another justification: in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation and a strategic adversary, a trader should seek to exploit price fluctuations so as disguise trading
activity.
In order to understand the behavior of linear policies, it is helpful to decompose them into deterministic
and stochastic components. Suppose that (π, ψ) are a pair of linear policies, and that y0 = µ0 = 0. Given
Definition 3 and Theorem 1, it is easy to see that, for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , there exist vectors αǫ,t, βǫ,t, γǫ,t ∈ Rt
and scalars αx0,t, βx0,t, γx0,t ∈ R, each of which depend on the parameters {σ0, λ, σǫ} only through the ρ0,
such that
(18) xt = αx0,tx0 +
1
λ
α⊤ǫ,tǫ
t, yt = βx0,tx0 +
1
λ
β⊤ǫ,tǫ
t, µt = γx0,tx0 +
1
λ
γ⊤ǫ,tǫ
t.
Here, ǫt = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫt) is the vector of exogenous disturbances up to time t. The first terms in (18) represent
deterministic components of the policy and the second terms represent zero-mean stochastic components
that depend on market price fluctuations. For the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies, the
stochastic components are zero. On the other hand, the Gaussian PBE policy does have non-zero stochastic
components.
Figure 6 shows the deterministic component of the linear-Gaussian PBE versus those of the equiparti-
tioning and minimum revelation policies. As ρ0 → 0, the trader ignores the presence of the arbitrageur and
the PBE policy approaches the equipartitioning policy. At the other extreme, as ρ0 →∞, in equilibrium the
trader seeks to conceal his activity as much as possible, and hence the PBE policy approaches the minimum
revelation policy.
Figure 7 illustrates sample paths of the trader’s position under the linear-Gaussian PBE policy. Along
each path, the trader deviates from the deterministic schedule based on the random fluctuations of the market
and how they influence the arbitrageur’s beliefs. In general, if the arbitrageur’s estimate of the trader’s
position becomes more accurate, the trader accelerates his selling to avoid front-running. On the other hand,
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Figure 6: The deterministic components of trading strategies for the time horizon T = 20.
if the arbitrageur is misled as to the trader’s position, the trader delays his selling relative to deterministic
schedule.
6. Extensions
In this section, we revisit some of the assumptions in the problem formulation of Section 2. At a high level,
the main feature of our model that enables tractability is that, in equilibrium, each agent solves a linear-
quadratic Gaussian control problem. This requires that the evolution of the model over time be described by
a linear system and that the objectives of the trader and arbitrageur be quadratic functions that decompose
additively over time. As we shall see shortly, there are a number of extensions of the model one may
consider, incorporating important phenomena such as risk aversion and transient price impact, that maintain
this structure. Such extensions remain tractable and can be addressed using straightforward adaptations of
the techniques we have developed.
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Figure 7: Sample paths of the evolution of the trader’s actual and expected positions, and the arbitrageur’s mean
belief, when T = 20, x0 = σ0 = 105, µ0 = y0 = 0, σǫ = 0.125, λ = 10−5.
6.1. Time Horizon
Our model assumes that the trader begins his liquidation at time 1 and completes it by time T , and that this
time interval is common knowledge. In some instances, public knowledge of the beginning and end of the
liquidation interval might be reasonable since, for example, this interval will often correspond to a single
trading day. More generally, however, it may be desirable to impose uncertainty on the part of arbitrageur as
to the beginning and end of the liquidation. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to allow for this in a tractable
fashion in our current framework.
The model further assumes that the arbitrageur must liquidate his position by time T + 1. Then, the
value function of the arbitrageur at time T with position yT , is given by V ∗T (yT ) = −λy2T . This was used in
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(5)–(6) to determine the value functions U∗T−1 and V ∗T−1, which form the base case of the backward induction.
This assumption can easily be relaxed. For example, suppose that the arbitrageur has Ta additional trading
periods. It is easy to see that, after time T , the arbitrageur will optimally equipartition over the remaining Ta
periods. Therefore the value of a position yT at time T will take the form V ∗T (yT ) = −λ
Ta+1
2Ta
y2T , following
the analysis in Bertsimas and Lo (1998). So long as V ∗T is a quadratic function, our discussion in Sections 3
and 4 carries through, with a different choice of terminal value functions.
6.2. Risk Aversion
Our model assumes that both the trader and arbitrageur are risk-neutral. One way to account for risk aversion
is to follow the approach suggested by Hora (2006). In particular, we could assume that, for example, the
trader seeks to optimize the objective function
E
[
T−1∑
τ=0
{
∆pτ+1xτ −
η
2
(
∆pτ+1xτ − E[∆pτ+1xτ | xτ , yτ , φτ ]
)2
− ζx2τ
} ∣∣∣∣∣ x0, y0, φ0
]
,
The second term in the sum penalizes for variance in revenue in each time period, with η ≥ 0 capturing
the degree of risk aversion. This final term represents a per stage holding cost, with the parameter ζ ≥ 0
expressing the degree to which the trader would prefer to execute sooner rather than later. The risk neutral
case previously considered corresponds to the choice of η = ζ = 0. For any nonnegative parameter choices,
the objective remains a time separable positive definite quadratic function. Hence, the methods of Sections 3
and 4 can be suitably adapted.
6.3. Price Impact & Price Dynamics
Our model assumed permanent and linear price impact. Empirically, it has been observed that transient price
impact is a significant component of price dynamics, and it is important to account for this in the design of
execution strategies.
More generally, our analysis applies when there is some collection of state variables (for example,
{xt, yt, µt}) that evolve as a linear dynamical system with Gaussian disturbances, and where changes in
price are linear in the state variables. In order to incorporate transient price impact, assume that prices evolve
31
according to
pt = p0 + λ
t∑
τ=1
(uτ + vτ + zτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
permanent price impact
+ γ
t∑
τ=1
αt−τ (uτ + vτ + zτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
transient price impact
.(19)
Here, uτ and vτ are the trades of the trader and arbitrageur, respectively, as time τ . In place of the exogenous
noise term in the original price dynamics (1), zτ is an IIDN(0, σ2z ) random variable representing the quantity
of noise trades at time τ . The second term in (19) captures a permanent, linear price impact with sensitivity
λ ≥ 0. The final term represents a transient, linear price impact with sensitivity γ ≥ 0 and recovery rate
α ∈ [0, 1).
These price dynamics can be rewritten as
pt = pt−1 + (λ+ γ)(ut + vt + zt)− γ(1− α)st−1,
where st is defined to be geometrically weighted total order flow
st ,
t∑
τ=0
αt−τ (uτ + vτ + zτ ) = αst−1 + (ut + vt + zt).
Now, suppose that the trader’s decisionut is a linear function of {xt−1 , yt−1, µt−1, st−1}, and the arbitrageur’s
decision vt is a linear function of {yt−1, µt−1, st−1}. Then, it will be the case that {xt, yt, µt, st} evolve as a
linear dynamical system, and that the price changes are linear in these state variables. Therefore, the analysis
in Sections 3 and 4 can be suitably modified and repeated, with an augmented state space. Note that, since
st is a function of only of the total quantities traded at times up to t, it is reasonable to assume that this is
public knowledge known to both the trader and arbitrageur.
Other aspects of more complicated price dynamics can also be incorporated via such state augmentation.
For example, one may consider linear factor models or other otherwise add exogenous explanatory variables
to the evolution of prices, so long as the dependencies are linear. Similarly, models that incorporate drift in
the price process, such as short term momentum or mean reversion, can be considered.
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6.4. Parameterized Policies
Beyond solving specific classes of models, results from the optimal execution literature offer useful guidance
on how to structure parameterized execution policies that can be effective even if modeling assumptions are
not entirely valid. In this vein, concepts we have developed can enhance parameterized policies that one
might design based on prior literature.
For example, consider designing an execution system which begins the trading day with a position
that must be liquidated by the end of that trading day. A number of models previously considered in the
literature result in deterministic linear policies (see, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo, 1998; Obizhaeva and Wang,
2005; Alfonsi et al., 2007a). In particular, for each tth time period during the course of the day, there is
a parameter at that indicates the fraction of the position to sell during that time period. These parameters
a0, . . . , aT−1 depend on asset-specific characteristics such as volatility and market impact model parameters.
Modeling assumptions often do not match reality. As such, it is useful to add flexibility by parametrizing
the execution policy. For example, we might employ a policy that sells a fraction θtat of the position during
each tth time period, where θ0, . . . , θT−1 are asset-independent parameters. Then, these parameters can be
tuned based on experience from trading all assets. It is important that the number of parameters does not
scale with the number of assets, because we would then be unlikely to have a sufficient amount of data to
tune parameters. In this regard, the way a0, . . . , aT−1 capture variations across assets is critical to the design
of an effective parametrization.
Our work motivates a generalized class of parameterized policies that adapt trades as price move-
ments are observed. Our model is optimized by an execution strategy with three sequences of coefficients:
{ax,t, ay,t, aµ,t | t = 0, . . . , T−1}. By simulating arbitrageur activity over the course of the day and applying
these coefficients appropriately, we produce a sequence of trades that adapt to price fluctuations. Similarly
with the case of a deterministic policy, we can introduce parameters {θx,t, θy,t, θµ,t | t = 0, . . . , T − 1} that
scale the policy coefficients, and tune these parameters based on experience. Once again, these parameters
are asset-independent while the coefficients {ax,t, ay,t, aµ,t | t = 0, . . . , T − 1} capture dependence of the
policy on asset-specific characteristics such as volatility and market impact model parameters.
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7. Conclusion
Our model captures strategic interactions between a trader aiming to liquidate a position and an arbitrageur
trying to detect and profit from the trader’s activity. The algorithm we have developed computes Gaussian
perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior. It is interesting that the resulting trader policy takes on such a simple
form: the number of shares to liquidate at time t is linear in the trader’s position xt−1, the arbitrageur’s
position yt−1 and the arbitrageur’s estimate µt−1 of xt−1. The coefficients of the policy depend only on the
relative volume parameter ρ0, which quantifies the magnitude of the trader’s position relative to the typical
market activity, and the time horizon T . This policy offers useful guidance beyond what has been derived in
models that do not account for arbitrageur behavior. In the absence of an arbitrageur, it is optimal to trade
equal amounts over each time period, which corresponds to a policy that is linear in xt−1. The difference
in the PBE policy stems from its accounting of the arbitrageur’s inference process. In particular, the policy
reduces information revealed to the arbitrageur by delaying trades and takes advantage of situations where
the arbitrageur has been misled by unusual market activity.
Our model represents a starting point for the study of game theoretic behavior in trade execution. It
has an admittedly simple structure, and this allows for a tractable analysis that highlights the importance of
information signaling. There are a number of extensions to this model that are possible, however, and that
warrant further discussion:
1. (Flexible Time Horizon) We assume finite time horizons T and T + 1 for the trader and arbitrageur,
respectively. The choice of time horizon has an impact on the resulting equilibrium policies, and there
are clearly end-of-horizon effects in the policies computed in Section 5. To some extent it seems
artificial to impose a fixed time horizon as an exogenous restriction on behavior. Fixed horizon models
preclude the trader from delaying liquidation beyond the horizon even if this can yield significant
benefits, for example. A better model would be to consider an infinite horizon game, where risk
aversion provides the motivation for liquidating a position sooner rather than later.
2. (Uncertain Trader) In our model, we assume that the arbitrageur is uncertain of the trader’s position,
but that the trader knows everything. A more realistic model would allow for uncertainty on the part
of the trader as well, and would allow for the arbitrageur to mislead the trader.
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3. (Multi-player Games) Our model restricts to a single trader and arbitrageur. A natural extension would
be to consider multiple traders and arbitrageurs that are uncertain about each others’ positions and must
compete in the marketplace as they unwind. Such a generalized model could be useful for analysis of
important liquidity issues such as those arising from the credit crunch of 2007.
Also of interest are the potential empirical implications of the model. If we make the assumption that the
trade execution horizon is a single day, the observations in Section 5 suggest particular patterns for intraday
volume. For example, if ρ0 is large, the volume traded should be much higher near the end of the day then
at other times. Similarly, the structure of the equilibrium trading policies for the trader and arbitrageur will
generate specific, time-varying auto-correlation in the increments of the price process. Formulating tests of
such empirical predictions in any interesting area for future research.
Finally, beyond the immediate context of our model, there are many directions worth exploring. One
important avenue is to factor data beyond price into the execution strategy. For example, volume data may
play a significant role in the arbitrageur’s inference, in which case it should also influence execution decisions.
Limit order book data may also be relevant. Developing tractable models that account for such data remains
a challenge. One initiative to incorporate limit order book data into the decision process is presented by
Nevmyvaka et al. (2006).
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A. Proofs
Theorem 1. If the belief distribution φt−1 at time is Gaussian, and the arbitrageur assumes that the trader’s
policy πˆt is linear with πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = aˆρt−1x,t xt−1+aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1+aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1, then the belief distribution
φt is also Gaussian. The mean µt is a linear function of yt−1, µt−1, and the observed price change ∆pt,
with coefficients that are deterministic functions of the scaled variance ρt−1. The scaled variance ρt evolves
according to
ρ2t =
(
1 + aˆ
ρt−1
x,t
)2( 1
ρ2t−1
+ (aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
)−1
.
In particular, ρt is a deterministic function of ρt−1.
Proof. Set {Kt−1, ht−1} to be the information form parameters for the Gaussian distribution φt−1, so that
Kt−1 , 1/σ
2
t−1, and ht−1 , µt−1/σ2t−1.
Define φ+t−1 to be the distribution of xt−1 conditioned on all information seen by the arbitrageur at times up
to and including t. That is,
φ+t−1(S) , Pr
(
xt−1 ∈ S | φt−1, yt−1, λ(πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) + vt) + ǫt = ∆pt
)
,
where ∆pt is the price change observed at time t. By Bayes’ rule, this distribution has density
φ+t−1(dx) ∝ φt−1(dx) exp
(
−
(
∆pt − λ(πt(x, yt−1, φt−1) + ψt(yt−1, φt−1))
)2
2σ2ǫ
)
∝ exp
(
−12
(
Kt−1 +
λ2(aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
σ2ǫ
)
x2
+
(
ht−1 +
λ
(
∆pt − λ(aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1 + ψt)
)
aˆx,t
σ2ǫ
)
x
)
dx.
Thus, φ+t−1 is a Gaussian distribution, with variance
(
Kt−1 +
λ2(aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
σ2ǫ
)−1
,
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and mean
(
Kt−1 +
λ2(aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
σ2ǫ
)−1(
ht−1 +
λ
(
∆pt − λ(aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1 + ψt)
)
aˆx,t
σ2ǫ
)
.
Now, note that
xt = xt−1 + πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = (1 + aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )xt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
Then, φt is also a Gaussian distribution, with variance
(20) σ2t = (1 + aˆρt−1x,t )2
(
Kt−1 +
λ2(aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
σ2ǫ
)−1
= (1 + aˆx,t)
2
(
1
σ2t−1
+
λ2(aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
σ2ǫ
)−1
,
and mean
µt = aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1
+ (1 + aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
µt−1/ρ
2
t−1 +
(
∆pt/λ− aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 − aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1 − ψt
)
aˆx,t
1/ρ2t−1 + (aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
.
(21)
The conclusions of the theorem immediately follow. 
In order to prove Theorems 2–4, it is necessary to explicitly evaluate the operator F (ψt,πt)ut applied to
quadratic functions of {xt, yt, µt} and the operator Gπtvt applied to quadratic functions of {yt, µt}. The
following lemma is helpful for this purpose, as it provides expressions for the expectation of µt and µ2t under
various distributions.
Lemma 1. Assume that the the policies ψt and πt are linear with
πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = a
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
ψt(yt−1, φt−1) = b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
Define
γ
ρt−1
t ,
1 + a
ρt−1
x,t
1/ρ2t−1 + (a
ρt−1
x,t )
2
.
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Then,
E
(ψt,πt)
ut
[µt | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1] = a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1 + γ
ρt−1
t µt−1/ρ
2
t−1
+ γ
ρt−1
t a
ρt−1
x,t
(
ut − a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 − a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1
)
,
(22a)
Var(ψt,πt)ut [µt | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1] =
(
γ
ρt−1
t a
ρt−1
x,t σǫ/λ
)2
,(22b)
E
(ψt,πt)
ut
[
µ2t
∣∣ xt−1, yt−1, φt−1] = Var(ψt,πt)ut [µt | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1]
+
(
E
(ψt,πt)
ut
[µt | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1]
)2
,
(22c)
E
πt
vt
[µt | yt−1, φt−1] = a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + (1 + a
ρt−1
x,t + a
ρt−1
µ,t )µt−1,(22d)
Varπtvt [µt | yt−1, φt−1] =
(
γ
ρt−1
t a
ρt−1
x,t σǫ/λ
)2 (
1 +
(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2
ρ2t−1
)
,(22e)
E
πt
vt
[
µ2t
∣∣ yt−1, φt−1] = Varπtvt [µt | yt−1, φt−1] + (Eπtvt [µt | yt−1, φt−1])2 .(22f)
Proof. The lemma follows directly from taking expectations of the mean update equation (21). 
Theorem 2. If U∗t is TQD and V ∗t is AQD, and Step 3 of Algorithm 2 produces a linear pair (π∗t , ψ∗t ), then
U∗t−1 and V ∗t−1, defined by Step 4 of Algorithm 2 are TQD and AQD, respectively.
Proof. Suppose that
V ∗t (yt, φt) = −λ
(
1
2d
ρt
yy,ty
2
t +
1
2d
ρt
µµ,tµ
2
t + d
ρt
yµ,tytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
dρt0,t
)
,
π∗t (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = a
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
ψ∗t (yt−1, φt−1) = b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
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If the trader uses the policy π∗t and the arbitrageur uses the policy ψ∗t , we have
ut = a
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
vt = b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
yt = yt−1 + b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
Using these facts, Theorem 1, and (22d)–(22f) from Lemma 1, we can explicitly compute
V ∗t−1(yt−1, φt−1) =
(
G
π∗t
ψ∗t
V
)
(yt−1, φt−1)
= E
π∗t
ψ∗t
[
λ(ut + vt)yt−1 + V
∗
t (yt, φt)
∣∣∣ yt−1, φt−1]
= −λ
(
1
2d
ρt−1
yy,t−1y
2
t +
1
2d
ρt−1
µµ,t−1µ
2
t + d
ρt−1
yµ,t−1ytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
d
ρt−1
0,t−1
)
,
where
ρ2t =
(
1 + aˆ
ρt−1
x,t
)2( 1
ρ2t−1
+ (aˆ
ρt−1
x,t )
2
)−1
,
d
ρt−1
yy,t−1 =
(
dρtyy,t −
(dρtyµ,t)
2
dρtyy,t
)
(aρty,t)
2 + 2
(
dρtyµ,t
dρtyy,t
− 1
)
aρty,t −
1
dρtyy,t
+ 2,
d
ρt−1
yµ,t−1 = −a
ρt
µ,t − a
ρt
x,t +
(
dρtyµ,t
dρtyy,t
+
(
dρtµµ,t −
(dρtyµ,t)
2
dρtyy,t
)
aρty,t
)
(1 + aρtx,t + a
ρt
y,t),
d
ρt−1
µµ,t−1 =
(
dρtµµ,t −
(dρtyµ,t)
2
dρtyy,t
)
(1 + aρtx,t + a
ρt
y,t)
2,
d
ρt−1
0,t−1 = d
ρt
0,t +
dρtµµ,t
2
(
aρtx,tγ
ρt−1
t
σǫ
λ
)2 (
1 + (ρt−1a
ρt
x,t)
2
)
.
Therefore, V ∗t−1 is AQD. Similarly, we can check that U∗t−1 is TQD. 
Theorem 3. Suppose that U∗t and V ∗t and TQD/AQD value functions specified by (10)–(11), and (π∗t , ψ∗t ) are
linear policies specified by (7)–(8). Assume that, for all ρt−1, the policy coefficients satisfy the first order
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conditions
0 =
(
ρ2t c
ρt
µµ,t + 2ρtc
ρt
xµ,t + c
ρt
xx,t
)(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)3
+
(
3cρtxx,t + 3ρtc
ρt
xµ,t − 1
)(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2
+
(
3cρtxx,t + ρtc
ρt
xµ,t − 2
)
a
ρt−1
x,t + c
ρt
xx,t − 1,
(23)
a
ρt−1
y,t = −
(
b
ρt−1
y,t + 1
)(
cρtxy,t + αtc
ρt
yµ,t
)
cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)c
ρt
xµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
,(24)
a
ρt−1
µ,t = −
a
ρt−1
x,t b
ρt−1
µ,t
(
cρtxy,t + αtc
ρt
yµ,t
)
+ αt
(
cρtxµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
)
/ρ2t−1
a
ρt−1
x,t
(
cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)c
ρt
xµ,t + αtc
ρt
µµ,t
) ,(25)
b
ρt−1
y,t =
1− dρtyµ,ta
ρt−1
y,t
dρtyy,t
− 1, b
ρt−1
µ,t = −
(1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t + a
ρt−1
x,t )d
ρt
yµ,t
dρtyy,t
,(26)
and the second order conditions
(27) cρtxx,t + (αt + 1)cρtxµ,t + αtcρtµµ,t > 0, dρtyy,t > 0,
where the quantities αt and ρt satisfy
(28) αt =
a
ρt−1
x,t
(
1 + a
ρt−1
x,t
)
1/ρ2t−1 +
(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2 , ρ2t = (1 + aρt−1x,t )2
(
1
ρ2t−1
+
(
a
ρt−1
x,t
)2)−1
.
Then, (π∗t , ψ∗t ) satisfy the single-stage equilibrium conditions
π∗t (xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F
(ψ∗t ,π
∗
t )
ut U
∗
t
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1),(29)
ψ∗t (yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
G
π∗t
vt V
∗
t
)
(yt−1, φt−1),(30)
for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1.
Proof. As we will discuss in the proof of Theorem 4, the optimizing value u∗t in (29) is a linear function
of xt−1, yt−1 and zt−1, whose coefficients depend on {aρt−1x,t , a
ρt−1
y,t , a
ρt−1
µ,t , b
ρt−1
y,t , b
ρt−1
µ,t }. By equating the
coefficients of {xt−1, yt−1, zt−1} with {aρt−1x,t , a
ρt−1
y,t , a
ρt−1
µ,t }, respectively, we can obtain (23), (24) and 25.
(26) can be derived by considering (30) in the same way. (27) corresponds to the second order conditions
for the two maximization problems. 
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Theorem 4. If Ut is TQD, ψt is linear, and πˆt is linear, then there exists a linear πt such that
πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
ut
(
F (ψt,πˆt)ut Ut
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1),
for all xt−1, yt−1, and Gaussian φt−1, so long as the optimization problem is bounded. Similarly, if Vt is
AQD and πt is linear then there exists a linear ψt such that
ψt(yt−1, φt−1) ∈ argmax
vt
(
Gπtvt Vt
)
(yt−1, φt−1),
for all yt−1 and Gaussian φt−1, so long as the optimization problem is bounded.
Proof. Suppose that
Ut(xt, yt, φt) = −λ
(
1
2c
ρt
xx,tx
2
t +
1
2c
ρt
yy,ty
2
t +
1
2c
ρt
µµ,tµ
2
t
+ cρtxy,txtyt + c
ρt
xµ,txtµt + c
ρt
yµ,tytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
cρt0,t
)
,
πˆt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = aˆ
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + aˆ
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
ψt(yt−1, φt−1) = b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
If the trader takes the action ut, while the arbitrageur uses the policy ψ∗t and assumes that the trader uses the
policy πˆt, we have
vt = b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
xt = xt−1 + ut,
yt = yt−1 + b
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + b
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
Using these facts, Theorem 1, and (22a)–(22c) from Lemma 1, we can explicitly compute
(
F (ψt,πˆt)ut Ut
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = E
(ψt,πˆt)
ut
[λ(ut + vt)xt−1 + Ut(xt, yt, φt) | xt−1, yt−1, φt−1] .
It is easy to see that
(
F
(ψt,πˆt)
ut Ut
)
(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) is quadratic in ut. Moreover, the coefficient of u2t is
independent of {xt−1, yt−1, µt−1} while the coefficient of ut is linear in {xt−1, yt−1, µt−1}. Therefore, the
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optimizing u∗t is a linear function of {xt−1, yt−1, µt−1}, whose coefficients can be computed by substitution
and rearrangement of the resulting terms.
Similarly, suppose that
Vt(yt, φt) = −λ
(
1
2d
ρt
yy,ty
2
t +
1
2d
ρt
µµ,tµ
2
t + d
ρt
yµ,tytµt −
σ2ǫ
λ2
dρt0,t
)
,
πt(xt−1, yt−1, φt−1) = a
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1.
If the arbitrageur takes the action vt and assumes that the trader uses the policy πt, we have
ut = a
ρt−1
x,t xt−1 + a
ρt−1
y,t yt−1 + a
ρt−1
µ,t µt−1,
yt = yt−1 + vt.
Using these facts, Theorem 1, and (22d)–(22f) from Lemma 1, we can explicitly compute
(
GπtvtVt
)
(yt−1, φt−1) = E
πt
vt [λ(πt + vt)yt−1 + Vt(yt, φt) | yt−1, φt−1] .
It is easily checked that
(
GπtvtVt
)
(yt−1, φt−1) is quadratic in vt. Moreover, the coefficient of v2t is independent
of {yt−1, µt−1} while the coefficient of vt is linear in {yt−1, µt−1}. Therefore, the optimizing v∗t is a linear
of {yt−1, µt−1}, whose coefficients can be computed by substitution and rearrangement of the resulting
terms. 
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